


# C ONFERENCE DIPLOMACY

by

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	PAGE
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS	611
Big-Power Maneuvering on the Middle East	611
General Assembly as Summit Forum in Crises	613
Continued Soviet Insistence on Summit Parley	613
CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY IN PEACE AND WAR	614
Start of New Diplomatic Era at Paris, 1919	614
Conference Diplomacy Between World Wars	616
Summit Refusal and Summit Success in 1941	617
Wartime Series of Meetings at the Summit	618
Secret Diplomacy vs. Negotiating in the Open	620
DIPLOMACY AT THE SUMMIT SINCE 1953	623
Churchill's Urging of New Summit Contacts	623
Geneva Summit Meeting and the Aftermath	626
Suez Invasion Crisis and Top-Level Meetings	627
NATO's Summit Session; Moscow's Summit Drive	628

Aug. 11  
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## CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY

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**S**OVIET DEMANDS for a summit conference on the Middle East, discussed back and forth for three weeks in contentious correspondence between Premier Khrushchev and the heads of Western governments, have finally produced an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Neither the independent top-level parley originally sought by the Soviet Union nor a Western-favored meeting in the framework of the U.N. Security Council survived East-West jockeying for position in a public debate on conduct of the great powers in a crisis-ridden corner of the world.

Periodic conferences during World War II between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with the later addition of Premier Stalin, proved an invaluable means of reaching mutual agreement on plans for war and peace. When the practice of summit diplomacy was revived at Geneva in 1955, the participants were deeply divided on the questions before them and no more than a semblance of agreement was achieved. Relief of cold war tensions was not the spur to harmony that had been provided a decade earlier by the drive for victory over a tangible enemy; diametrically opposed interests would not yield to genuine compromise.

Recent maneuvering to project the Middle East into the realm of summit diplomacy was hardly animated by a spirit of accommodation. When Khrushchev on July 19 proposed that President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Macmillan, French Premier de Gaulle, and Indian Prime Minister Nehru meet him three days later at Geneva, he called the dispatch of American marines to Lebanon and of British paratroopers to Jordan "military invasion" and "armed intervention" and accused the United States and Great Britain of planning to intervene in Iraq.<sup>1</sup> In reply-

<sup>1</sup> The marines were ordered to Lebanon on July 15, the paratroopers to Jordan on July 17, at the request of the governments of those countries, to check any spread of the revolution which had overturned the monarchy in Iraq on July 14.

### *Editorial Research Reports*

ing on July 22, suggesting a heads-of-government meeting in the framework of the Security Council, President Eisenhower told Khrushchev that "The real danger of war would come if one small nation after another were to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the Soviet Union."

A Soviet message the next day accepted the plan for a special Security Council meeting attended by heads of government but held to the thesis that it was the West which was "following a policy of expansionism and aggression." Washington then began to suspect that Khrushchev would try to use a Security Council meeting to brand the United States and Britain as aggressors before world opinion. Eisenhower accordingly notified the Soviet Premier, July 25, that this country would not agree to limit the discussion to Lebanon and Jordan; it must cover "the problems of the Middle East, including the causes of those problems." The President, in addition, sought to squelch Khrushchev's plans to invite participation by numerous non-members of the Security Council by insisting on adherence to established rules and on leaving the arrangements to the permanent representatives of Council members.

After the Soviet Premier in still another exchange of notes (July 28 and Aug. 1) had accused the United States of stalling, the President called for commencement of a Security Council summit session in any city except Moscow on or about Aug. 12. That was expected to end the sparring. Instead, on Aug. 3, the world received the surprise announcement that Khrushchev had spent the previous four days in Peiping in conference with Mao Tse-tung, Red China's chief of state. Whether Mao put up persuasive objections to Khrushchev's participation in a summit conference which Nationalist China's President, Chiang Kai-shek, would have had the right to attend—or whether the intervening recognition of the new Iraqi government by the Western powers took too much wind out of Soviet propaganda sails—the Russians on Aug. 5 gave up the idea of pressing their case in the Security Council. Instead, they called for an immediate meeting of the General Assembly to discuss the question of withdrawing Western troops from Lebanon and Jordan. President Eisenhower agreed to that procedure, with the understanding that the General Assembly would discuss also the question of indirect aggression in the Middle East.

## Conference Diplomacy

### GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS SUMMIT FORUM IN CRISES

When the General Assembly was convened in extraordinary session for the first time on Nov. 1, 1956, to act on the Suez crisis, it proved itself a more effective body than the veto-hobbled Security Council. Demonstration of the Assembly's ability to act expeditiously and effectively made a Swiss proposal at that time for a summit conference of the Big Four and India only mildly appealing.<sup>2</sup> Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, now president of the General Assembly, said at the United Nations, Nov. 6, 1956, that he would not be surprised if the foreign ministers shortly to arrive for the opening of the Assembly's regular session,<sup>3</sup> turned out "to constitute a kind of summit conference . . . which could go far toward serving the same purpose as the Swiss have suggested."<sup>4</sup> Most of the foreign ministers who would have accompanied the heads of government at a Middle East summit conference are to be on hand for the current special General Assembly session, and President Eisenhower may address the delegates. In this case, however, it is feared that the meeting will provide the setting for an angry spate of charges and countercharges rather than general agreement on a strong course of action.

Transfer of the Middle East problem from the Security Council to the General Assembly has not put an end to the possibility that the Western powers will soon be importuned again to agree to a meeting at the summit. Less than two months ago the American, British, and French ambassadors at Moscow were seeking common ground with the Soviet foreign minister for a top-level conference for which the Kremlin had been campaigning since last December. Khrushchev gave notice in his latest letter to President Eisenhower, Aug. 5, that the Soviets had not abandoned hope of arranging that meeting on numerous questions at issue between East and West. "We are convinced," he said, "that a summit conference . . . will help, with the efforts of all its participants, to find ways and means for liquidating the state of a 'cold war' to render the emergence of a hot war impossible." The Soviet Premier added that "The speediest convening of a summit conference is in the interest of all states, great or small."

<sup>2</sup> See p. 627.

<sup>3</sup> The annual session of the General Assembly usually convenes in September but was deferred in 1956 to Nov. 12, to avoid meeting during the U.S. presidential campaign.

<sup>4</sup> Two prime ministers and 33 foreign ministers attended the opening of the regular 1956 session, but by then the Suez crisis had considerably abated.

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## Conference Diplomacy in Peace and War

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THE GREAT CONFERENCE which assembled at Paris in 1919 to re-establish peace, and to found a world organization to keep the peace, ushered in a new diplomatic era—an era in which foreign ministers, prime ministers, even presidents, have come frequently to represent their countries in diplomatic negotiations. Participation of heads of government, occasionally heads of state,<sup>5</sup> in international conferences was not unknown in the century before World War I. Napoleon and Czar Alexander personally negotiated the preliminaries of the Peace of Tilsit in 1807; Alexander headed the Russian delegation at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15; and at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the prime ministers in attendance included such luminaries as Bismarck and Disraeli. But these were exceptional cases. It was then unusual for chiefs of government, or even cabinet ministers, to conduct face-to-face negotiations in foreign affairs; such business was left to “skilled, tactful, and experienced intermediaries”—the professional diplomats.<sup>6</sup>

The Paris peace conference, like the Congress of Vienna, brought together a large proportion of the leading statesmen of the day. President Wilson was the only head of state among them, but heads of government were there in force and foreign ministers made almost as large a showing as prime ministers. After the peace treaties had been written, ministers of the principal European war allies were kept busy for several years attending a series of conferences held to clear up questions left unsettled at Paris. Meanwhile, League of Nations meetings at Geneva were bringing cabinet ministers of additional countries into periodic personal contact and giving continuing impetus to the practice of conference diplomacy.

### WILSON'S DECISION TO ATTEND PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson's decision to take personal leadership of the group that would represent the United States at the peace negotiations in Europe had a mixed reception when announced a week after the Armistice. It was virtually

<sup>5</sup> The President of the United States is both head of government and head of state, but in countries with a parliamentary form of government the prime minister or premier is head of government and the monarch or president is head of state.

<sup>6</sup> Lord Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference* (1946), p. 12.

### Conference Diplomacy

unprecedented for a Chief Executive to leave the country,<sup>7</sup> and uneasiness was felt over Wilson's prospective absence for a protracted period, particularly when Congress would be in session.<sup>8</sup> Fear was expressed in some quarters, moreover, that the American President, an idealist and an educator by profession, would prove no match for wily European diplomats in hard bargaining around the conference table.

Some of Wilson's closest advisers were of opinion that, after laying down the broad principles (Fourteen Points, etc.) which had been made the basis of the Armistice, the President should stay out of the fray and hold himself in position to pass independent judgment on how well or poorly the conference was living up to those principles. Harry A. Garfield, Fuel Administrator, later related to Stephen Bonsal that he had urged the President not to go to Europe. "I and many of your other friends for whom I am speaking," Garfield told Wilson, "fear that if you do go you will have to descend from your present position of world arbiter. You will necessarily become a combatant in the hurly-burly. You will become a contestant in the struggle, in the struggle of which you are the only possible referee."<sup>9</sup>

Colonel House, already in France on behalf of the President, cabled him on Nov. 14, 1918, that leading Americans there were "practically unanimous in the belief that it would be unwise for you to sit in the peace conference," that Clemenceau thought that "no head of state should sit there," and that he had been told that the British were likewise opposed. But Wilson cabled back in irritation: "I infer that the French and British leaders desire to exclude me from the conference for fear that there I might lead the weaker nations against them. I play the same role in our government as the prime ministers do in theirs. The fact that I am head of the state is of no practical importance."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The only exceptions had been brief visits by Theodore Roosevelt and Taft to Panama and Cuba.

<sup>8</sup> Wilson sailed for France on the *George Washington*, Dec. 4, 1918, five weeks before the conference opened on Jan. 12, 1919; he returned to Washington on Feb. 24 to be on hand for the March 3 adjournment of Congress, it then being considered necessary for the President to sign last-minute bills before sine die adjournment to avoid a pocket veto. Wilson sailed for Europe again on March 6 and remained there until the day after the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28; he arrived back in the United States on July 8.

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Bonsal, *Unfinished Business* (1944), p. 10.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12. Stephen Bonsal, foreign correspondent, was at this time an adviser of Colonel House and served in like capacity with Wilson at the peace conference.

### *Editorial Research Reports*

The President told Congress in his annual message, Dec. 2, 1918, two days before sailing, that he considered it his "paramount duty" to attend the conference.

The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance both to us and to the rest of the world. . . . The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have consciously fought for the ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country; I have sought to express those ideals; they have accepted my statements of them . . . as the associated governments have accepted them; I owe it to them to see to it, so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, and no possible effort omitted to realize them.

In the European cities Wilson visited before the peace conference opened on Jan. 12, he received a tumultuous popular welcome as champion of a new order in world affairs. When it came to negotiating, the President won incorporation of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the peace treaties and gained wide recognition for the principle of national self-determination. Although he was forced to make compromises in order to obtain concessions, he felt he could look to the League for action to correct errors or omissions in the peacemaking. Wilson's success at Paris, however, was turned into failure at home when the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and thus kept the United States out of the world organization.

#### CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN WORLD WARS

When the Republicans returned to power in 1921, they were careful at first to keep their distance from the fledgling League of Nations and in general to follow an isolationist course. The 1921-22 Washington conference on naval limitation and Pacific problems was a conspicuous exception to the latter rule. The American delegation was headed, not by President Harding, but by Secretary of State Hughes. Premier Briand led the representatives of France, and the chief British representative was Lord Balfour, former Foreign Secretary and still a member of Lloyd George's cabinet. The Washington conference achieved a real measure of naval disarmament, though in the narrow range of capital ships, and also succeeded, through negotiation of treaties applicable to the Pacific area, in halting temporarily a rise of tension between this country and Japan.

Most of the conference diplomacy in which the United States engaged in this period of Republican ascendancy



## *Conference Diplomacy*

was restricted to the field of disarmament. A conference on the ambassadorial level, convened in Geneva in 1927 to limit naval cruiser strength, failed for lack of adequate preparation. But moderate further advances in naval limitation were incorporated in a treaty negotiated at a conference in London in 1930, to which the United States sent a delegation headed by Secretary of State Stimson. Personal diplomacy by heads of government (President Hoover's conferences with Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in Washington and at Hoover's camp on the Rapidan in October 1929) had featured careful spadework for the parley that opened in London the following January. By that time the United States was cooperating in League of Nations preparations for a general disarmament conference and was represented by an ambassador-led delegation when the conference met at Geneva in February 1932.

President Roosevelt had been in office scarcely three months when he sent Secretary of State Hull, Assistant Secretary Raymond Moley, and others to the World Monetary and Economic Conference called by the League to meet in London in June 1933. However, when plans for international currency stabilization under consideration there appeared to endanger American domestic recovery from depression, Roosevelt refused to let the United States go along and was accused of torpedoing the conference.

The growing threat of war in Europe in the second half of the decade of the 1930s both fostered neutrality sentiment in this country and encouraged plans for strengthening peace machinery in the Western Hemisphere. Various instruments to carry out the latter objective were drawn up at a number of inter-American conferences in which Secretary Hull took part as head of the U.S. delegation. President Roosevelt himself traveled to Argentina by ship to address a special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held on his initiative in December 1936 at Buenos Aires.

### **SUMMIT REFUSAL AND SUMMIT SUCCESS IN 1941**

During the long negotiations with Japan that preceded the Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was repeatedly pressed to agree to a conference somewhere in the Pacific between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. Roosevelt was attracted by the idea and tentatively suggested a three- or four-day meeting at Juneau,

### *Editorial Research Reports*

Alaska. The Japanese sought to pin the Americans down to an early date and insisted that actual negotiations for settlement of outstanding differences could be left until later. Hull has written:

Japan's insistence on holding the meeting and leaving the "details" to be worked out later was in itself significant. It seemed to us that Japan was striving to push us into a conference from which general statements would issue—and Japan could then interpret and apply these statements to suit her own purpose...

President Roosevelt would have relished a meeting with Konoye, and at first he was excited at the prospect. But he instantly agreed that it would be disastrous to hold the meeting without first arriving at a satisfactory agreement. . . . As for me, I was thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with Konoye, without an advance agreement, could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all.<sup>11</sup>

Konoye fell from power on Oct. 16, 1941. Japan's militarists then gained full control with appointment of Gen. Tojo as premier, and Pearl Harbor followed.

When the proposal for a Pacific conference was first broached in mid-August 1941, Roosevelt had just returned from the Atlantic conference with Prime Minister Churchill. That happier episode in personal diplomacy by government chiefs, carried to conclusion aboard American and British warships off the coast of Newfoundland, had produced the Atlantic Charter of war aims and provided opportunity for initial contacts between chiefs of staff of the two countries—though the United States was still nominally neutral.

#### WARTIME SERIES OF MEETINGS AT THE SUMMIT

After this country became an active belligerent, conferences of Allied heads of government played a vital role in strategic planning and eventually in the planning for peace. Only a fortnight after Pearl Harbor, Churchill flew to Washington and spent three weeks with Roosevelt setting up machinery for close Anglo-American collaboration in every phase of war operations. The Prime Minister paid a second visit in the summer of 1942, and two months after American troops had landed in North Africa, Roosevelt flew by way of Brazil and West Africa to confer with Churchill at Casablanca. Two more Roosevelt-Churchill meetings, in Washington and at Quebec, followed in short order. The year 1943 closed with the first conference

<sup>11</sup> *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (1948), pp. 1024-1025.

## *Conference Diplomacy*

### WORLD WAR II SUMMIT CONFERENCES

<i>Place</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Chief conference subject</i>
Argentia, Nfld.	Aug. 9-12, 1941	Atlantic Charter
Washington	Dec. 22, 1941- Jan. 14, 1942	Machinery for joint conduct of war
Washington	June 19-25, 1942	Atomic bomb development; war planning (No. African invasion)
Casablanca	Jan. 15-23, 1943	War planning (Sicily invasion)
Washington	May 12-25, 1943	War planning (Normandy invasion, Pacific operations)
Quebec (first)	Aug. 19-23, 1943	War planning (Italian and Pacific operations)
Teheran and Cairo:		
Cairo (first)	Nov. 22-26, 1943	War planning (China, Burma operations)
Teheran	Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1943	War and postwar planning
Cairo (second)	Dec. 4-6, 1943	Talks with Turks; choice of Eisenhower for Normandy invasion command
Quebec (second)	Sept. 11-16, 1944	Morgenthau plan for Germany
Yalta	Feb. 4-11, 1945	Postwar and U.N. planning
Potsdam	July 17-Aug. 2, 1945	Occupation of Germany

NOTE: Churchill attended all conferences, Roosevelt all through Yalta; Stalin attended Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences; Chiang Kai-shek was at Cairo; Attlee took Churchill's place at Potsdam after latter's electoral defeat and resignation; Truman attended Potsdam conference.

with Stalin at Teheran, which was preceded and followed by meetings at Cairo with Chiang Kai-shek.

Three months after Gen. Eisenhower had led the Allies ashore in Normandy, Roosevelt and Churchill had another bilateral session at Quebec. The discussions now centered increasingly on Pacific operations, on arrangements for the treatment of defeated enemies, and on plans for a world organization. These questions dominated the Yalta conference, where Russia secretly agreed to enter the war against Japan after Germany's surrender and where final sticking points about the United Nations were resolved.

Because military planning was one of the chief purposes of the wartime summit conferences, the chiefs of staff regularly attended the meetings and commanding officers fre-

### *Editorial Research Reports*

quently were called in from the field. At Teheran, when postwar questions were beginning to come to the fore, British Foreign Secretary Eden and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov attended, but Secretary of State Hull was left at home. However, Roosevelt had Stettinius, Hull's successor at the State Department, with him at Yalta, and Secretary of State Byrnes accompanied Truman to Potsdam.

Tremendous staffs were present at some of the wartime conferences. Roosevelt and Churchill together took nearly 500 persons to Cairo in 1943.<sup>12</sup> At the Malta airfield on the night of Feb. 2-3, 1945, "Transport planes were taking off at ten-minute intervals from 11:30 P.M. to dawn to carry some seven hundred people, including the President and the Prime Minister, fourteen hundred miles across the Aegean and Anatolia and the Black Sea to Saki airfield in the Crimea."<sup>13</sup>

After the war the task of European peacemaking was left largely to the Council of Foreign Ministers, created at Potsdam for that purpose. Soviet objections to proposed procedure for concluding peace with Japan held up action in that quarter until 1951. The United States and other countries then went ahead without Russia and signed a treaty with Japan which had been negotiated virtually single-handedly by John Foster Dulles, acting as a special adviser to Secretary of State Acheson. President Truman made ceremonial visits to Canada and Mexico in 1947 and traveled to Brazil the same year to address an inter-American conference at Rio, but he participated in no summit conferences after Potsdam.

#### SECRET DIPLOMACY VS. NEGOTIATING IN THE OPEN

The first of the Fourteen Points which Woodrow Wilson had outlined as a program for world peace<sup>14</sup> called for "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." Thereafter, he declared, "There shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." Although Wilson disclaimed prior knowledge of the secret treaties whose commitments complicated achievement of his peace aims at Paris, he shared a widespread popular distrust of old-fashioned secret diplomacy. He was convinced that peace would be promoted, and the people's interest served, if

<sup>12</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (1951), p. 326.

<sup>13</sup> Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (Vol. 2, 1948), p. 490.

<sup>14</sup> In an address to a joint session of Congress, Jan. 8, 1918.

## Conference Diplomacy

negotiations between nations were honestly conducted "in the public view" and agreements recorded for all to know.

To put teeth in the American President's demand for "open covenants," an article of the League of Nations Covenant required registration with the League secretariat of "every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the League"; the article stipulated, moreover, that no such agreement "shall be binding until so registered." Wilson found at Paris, however, that it was one thing to insist on open covenants and another to arrive at them openly and in the public view. The Council of Ten, which initially directed the work of the conference, eventually gave way to the Council of Four, not only because the larger group's numbers impeded progress but also because its deliberations, conducted in secret, did not remain secret. The Big Four (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando) met at Wilson's Paris residence—at first with only an interpreter present, later with a secretary to keep minutes—"while one American marine stood with fixed bayonet at the study door and another patrolled the short strip of garden outside."<sup>15</sup>

The man who kept the minutes for the Council of Four, Baron (then Sir Maurice) Hankey of the British Foreign Office, has expatiated on the advantages of negotiating in small private meetings:

The proceedings of the Council of Four were quite informal and unhampered by rules or written procedure. These four men of wide and varied political experience were free to conduct the business in the best way they could discover. . . . In the intimacy of this small circle personal resources were available which could not be used to the same extent in a larger and more formal gathering. . . .

My personal experience is that the most important elements of success in diplomacy by conference are elasticity of procedure, small numbers, informality, mutual acquaintance and, if possible, personal friendship among the principals, a proper perspective between secrecy in deliberation and publicity in results.<sup>16</sup>

Another veteran of British diplomacy, Harold Nicolson, has been critical of "the increasing practice of indulging

<sup>15</sup> Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (1954), p. 76. Wilson's biographer has quoted a "little known passage" from a letter to Secretary of State Lansing, June 12, 1918, which indicates that Wilson, in calling for open diplomacy, did not mean quite what his words had been taken to mean: "When I pronounced for open diplomacy, I meant, not that there should be no private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreements should be entered into, and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above board, and explicit."—Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Vol. I 1922), p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> Lord Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference* (1946), p. 29 and p. 36.

### *Editorial Research Reports*

in the method of diplomacy by conference," though conceding that "confidential negotiations that lead to secret pledges are worse even than the televised diplomacy that we enjoy today." Nicolson has suggested that Wilson, in calling for "the reign of law . . . sustained by the organized opinion of mankind," failed to foresee "that the conscience of mankind . . . might prove inadequate when faced by a dictator controlling all means of information." As for United Nations meetings:

These conferences do little to satisfy the vague desire for what is called "open diplomacy." . . . The theory that "diplomacy should proceed always frankly and in the public view" has led to negotiation being broadcast and televised, and to all rational discussion being abandoned in favor of interminable propaganda speeches addressed, not to those with whom the delegate is supposed to be negotiating, but to his own public at home. . . . Such negotiation as may occur in New York is not conducted within the walls of the tall building by the East River; it is carried out elsewhere, in accordance with those principles of courtesy, confidence and discretion which must forever remain the only principles conducive to the peaceful settlement of disputes.<sup>17</sup>

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) observed last winter that open diplomacy practiced under United Nations procedures encouraged "propaganda, obstinacy and inertia" and was "not the key to the kind of settlements that are likely to get the nations of the world off the sword's edge on which their survival now is so delicately balanced." Pointing out that traditional diplomacy had its merits, as evidenced by its successful use to end the Berlin blockade in 1948 and to settle the stubborn Trieste question in 1954, Mansfield suggested that a formula of "open agreements arrived at in private" would re-emphasize "the constructive role of traditional diplomacy . . . while at the same time keeping this technique responsible to the people."<sup>18</sup>

Secrecy of varying degrees surrounded the wartime summit conferences; the public was not told of the Casablanca meeting until it had ended, of Yalta until it was under way. The military nature of all of the conferences required that there be only private sessions. Information as to what went on was limited to the contents of final communiques, but the communiques sometimes failed to mention agreements or commitments even of a non-military nature. The fact that the United States had agreed at

<sup>17</sup> Harold Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 78 and pp. 87-90.

<sup>18</sup> Mike Mansfield, "Open Agreements Privately Made," *New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 26, 1958, pp. 34 and 38.

## *Conference Diplomacy*

Yalta, for example, to support Russia's demand for separate representation in the United Nations for Byelorussia and the Ukraine was not made known until Mar. 29, 1945; texts of certain sections of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements were not released by the State Department until Mar. 24, 1947. Participants in most of the top-level conferences held in recent years have conferred in private, but the meetings have been attended by extensive publicity and their results spread on the record without apparent holding back.

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## **Diplomacy at the Summit Since 1953**

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SINCE EISENHOWER became President, he has been host to heads of state and heads of government from all quarters of the globe. In addition, he has taken the initiative to establish close personal relationships with the leaders of other Western Hemisphere countries. The Prime Minister of Canada and the President of Mexico were his guests for a three-day get-together at White Sulphur Springs in March 1956, and the following July he journeyed to Panama to meet the presidents of the Latin American republics. But while there have been numerous White House consultations with prime ministers and foreign ministers of Allied countries, most of the American diplomacy abroad, above ambassadorial levels, has been carried on by Secretary of State Dulles.

### **CHURCHILL'S URGING OF NEW SUMMIT CONTACTS**

It was only a few months after President Eisenhower took office that Winston Churchill, again Prime Minister, began to advocate a renewal of direct contacts between Western and Russian leaders at the summit. An armistice had not yet been effected in Korea, Communists were fighting French forces in Indochina, and the cold war was being waged almost as intensely as ever in the West. However, Stalin's death early in March 1953, and the changes of government taking place in Moscow, offered hope that some easing of East-West tensions might be achieved.

The President, delivering a major foreign policy address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on

### *Editorial Research Reports*

April 16, 1953, declared that the Soviet Union, after preventing the world from finding true peace after World War II, now had "a precious opportunity . . . to help turn the tide of history." Eisenhower named a series of actions—conclusion of a treaty with Austria, reunification of Germany, limitation of arms, control of atomic energy, etc.—needed to free "the energies, the resources and the imagination of all peaceful nations" for "total war . . . upon the brute forces of poverty and need." Progress waited only upon the answer to one question: "What is the Soviet Union ready to do?"

Churchill hailed the Eisenhower speech as a "massive and magnificent statement" and said in the House of Commons on April 20 that he hoped for a meeting of leaders of the principal powers engaged in the cold war. During a foreign policy debate on May 11, 1953, the Prime Minister called for "a conference on the highest level . . . between the leading powers without delay." The conversations, he said, should be "confined to the smallest number of persons and powers possible" and should not be impeded by "ponderous or rigid agenda" or by "jungles of technical details zealously contested by hordes of experts." He said that "At the worst, the participants in the meeting could . . . [establish] more intimate contacts, and at best we might have a generation of peace."<sup>19</sup>

The Eisenhower administration praised Churchill's "high purpose" and recalled the President's stated willingness to meet the Russians half-way. However, it insisted that demonstration of the sincerity of Red peace professions, by such deeds as immediate agreement to a Korean armistice, was needed "to pave the way toward a high-level conference." Although cold water was thus thrown on an East-West summit session, plans for a meeting in Bermuda of the Western Big Three heads of government were announced on May 21, 1953. On the same day, however, the French government fell; a prolonged cabinet crisis in Paris, followed by illness of Churchill, caused postponement of the conference originally scheduled for mid-June.

Eisenhower, Churchill, and Premier Joseph Laniel even-

<sup>19</sup> Churchill disclosed in Commons, March 2, 1955, that the stroke he had suffered in June 1953 had interrupted his efforts to arrange a Big Three summit meeting with Eisenhower and the then Soviet Premier, Malenkov. Churchill added, March 14, 1955, that he had invited Malenkov and Molotov to meet him in some West European city in August or September 1954 to arrange a top-level meeting of the major powers; he cancelled the invitation when Moscow started calling for a foreign ministers' meeting on European security.



## Conference Diplomacy

tually met at the Mid-Ocean Club in Bermuda from Dec. 4 to 8, 1953. The communique issued by the three expressed gratification at Moscow's recent agreement to a Big Four foreign ministers' meeting in Berlin; reaffirmed support of the projected European Defense Community; and said no opportunity would be lost to seek relaxation of tensions besetting the world. The Bermuda conference, clearly not productive of momentous results, was left rather inconspicuously in the background when the President flew to New York to present his widely heralded atoms-for-peace proposal to the U.N. General Assembly.

### PRELIMINARIES OF 1955 EAST-WEST CONFERENCE

The year 1954 failed to produce the "deeds, not words" by the Soviet Union which the Eisenhower administration had made the condition of a summit conference. Although an armistice had finally been signed in Korea, in July 1953, the Berlin foreign ministers' conference in January and February 1954 brought no progress on the German and Austrian questions.<sup>20</sup> Tension between East and West was increased in the summer and autumn when the Western powers agreed to end the occupation of West Germany and admit that country to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>21</sup>

Not long after Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Russian Premier, and Khrushchev and Marshal Zhukov moved in to make up a Kremlin triumvirate, in February 1955, Soviet tactics toward the West displayed a distinct change. Moscow on March 24 took the initiative which got long-stalled Austrian treaty negotiations off dead center and resulted in the signature, May 15, of a state treaty which led to termination of the occupation of Austria and to a declaration of permanent neutrality by that country. Meanwhile, hints that a similar settlement for Germany might be acceptable had come from the Kremlin, along with apparent Soviet concessions on disarmament.

Ratification of pacts readjusting the status of West Germany had opened the way, on the Western side, to reconsideration of the possibility of top-level negotiations with Russia. An influential prod in that direction had been given the Eisenhower administration by Chairman Walter F. George (D-Ga.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

<sup>20</sup> See "Germany and the Balance of Power," *E.R.R.*, 1955 Vol. I, pp. 411-412.

<sup>21</sup> See "German Rearmament," *E.R.R.*, 1954 Vol. II, pp. 758-765.

### *Editorial Research Reports*

mittee. He said on a radio-TV program, March 20, 1955, that a stage had been reached in international relations "when the real hope of avoiding war is through some high-level conferences between the leading powers." At a news conference three days later President Eisenhower said there was "no place on this earth to which I would not travel, . . . no chore I would not undertake, if I had any faintest hope that by doing so I would promote the general cause of world peace." Within a week it was made known that the State Department had initiated consultations with Great Britain and France on the possibility of holding a summit conference.

Identical notes to Moscow from the United States, Britain, and France on May 10, 1955, proposed an early conference "to remove sources of conflict between us." The Soviet Union responded favorably on May 26, and it was subsequently agreed to meet at Geneva on July 18. No fixed program of discussions was arranged in advance. While the three Western foreign ministers met several times to exchange views, preparatory talks with the Soviet foreign minister were limited to informal conversations in Vienna, at the time the Austrian treaty was signed, and in San Francisco at the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. When Secretary Dulles departed for Geneva, he pointed out that the conference was not expected to make "great decisions of substance." It was to be "a beginning and not an end," for its purpose would be "to identify the issues to be worked on in the future and to agree on the international procedures . . . for finding solutions."

#### **GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING AND THE AFTERMATH**

It was in this cautious frame of mind that President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, and Premier Faure of France journeyed to the summit in 1955 to meet Soviet Premier Bulganin.<sup>22</sup> The heads of government met seven times in public session during the six days of the conference (July 18-23) and numerous times informally. A four-point agenda drawn up by the foreign ministers on the second day included four subjects: German reunification, European security, disarmament, and improvement of East-

<sup>22</sup> Eden had succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister on April 6, 1955; Harold Macmillan, now Prime Minister, was then Foreign Secretary and accompanied Eden to the 1955 summit conference. Khrushchev and Zhukov were in the Soviet delegation. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld welcomed the dignitaries to the European headquarters of the United Nations, where the sessions were held.

### *Conference Diplomacy*

West relations. As anticipated, no attempt was made to reach detailed agreements on any questions. However, the conferees at their final meeting directed the foreign ministers to meet at Geneva in October to continue consideration of all four subjects. In addition, they recommended that the U.N. Disarmament subcommittee resume talks suspended two months earlier. No mention was made in the final communique of the "open skies" arms inspection plan advanced by President Eisenhower on July 21.

Upon his return to the United States the President warned against any assumption that "one week of friendly, even fruitful negotiations can wholly eliminate . . . a gulf as wide and deep as the difference between individual liberty and regimentation." Although each side at Geneva had "assured the other earnestly and often that it intended to pursue a new spirit of conciliation and cooperation," the "acid test" would come in the October foreign ministers' meeting, where "real conciliation and some giving on each side will be definitely necessary."

The smiling geniality which prevailed at Geneva turned to hard-lipped bargaining in the same city three months later. Even before the foreign ministers convened on Oct. 27, 1955, it was evident that neither the Soviet Union nor the Western powers had retreated from prior positions on Germany and European security,<sup>23</sup> and in the end no agreement proved possible on those or other questions delegated by the heads of government. One unmentioned but supposed accomplishment of the meeting at the summit was a tacit acknowledgment that full-scale nuclear warfare would be so calamitous that it had to be avoided if the world was to survive. Even that understanding, if it was in fact achieved, has since seemed at times too tenuous to endure. In any case, failure of the 1955 conference to lead to agreement in any other sector made the United States reluctant to take the summit path again.

#### **SUEZ INVASION CRISIS AND TOP-LEVEL MEETINGS**

The next suggestion for a top-level East-West meeting came from the Swiss government in the midst of the Suez crisis in November 1956. Only a matter of hours before the British and French ordered a cease-fire, Nov. 6, Switzerland invited the heads of government of the Big Four

<sup>23</sup> See "European Security," *E.R.R.*, 1955 Vol. II, pp. 713-718.

### *Editorial Research Reports*

powers and India to hold an immediate conference in that country to save humanity from "the danger of a third world war." The cease-fire order took the urgency out of this appeal, but all five countries with the exception of the United States indicated varying degrees of willingness to attend the proposed meeting. President Eisenhower informed the Swiss government, Nov. 10, that he shared Swiss concern but was convinced that the only hope for world peace lay in action by the United Nations.

Invasion of the Suez Canal zone by forces of France and Great Britain damaged this country's relations with its two principal NATO allies. Face-to-face meetings of the heads of government were resorted to early in 1957 to prop up the structure of Western cooperation. French Premier Guy Mollet and his foreign minister spent three days in Washington at the end of February conferring with the President and Secretary Dulles. Another Bermuda conference, March 21-24, brought Eisenhower and Macmillan, who had become Prime Minister upon Eden's resignation early in January, together for a thorough review of mutual political, economic, and defense problems.<sup>24</sup> Agreement over wide areas was reaffirmed. The United States promised to make certain guided missiles available for use by British forces and offered to participate actively in the work of the military committee of the Baghdad Pact.

#### NATO'S SUMMIT SESSION; MOSCOW'S SUMMIT DRIVE

Consternation caused last autumn by the military implications of Soviet Russia's sputnik launchings put new emphasis on the need for scientific cooperation among the Western allies and led to conversion of the December 1957 session of the North Atlantic Council into a NATO summit meeting. At a White House dinner for Queen Elizabeth, Oct. 17, President Eisenhower had called for scientific collaboration among the NATO partners, and he and Prime Minister Macmillan, who conferred Oct. 23-25, had issued a "declaration of common purpose" which advocated "an enlarged Atlantic effort in scientific research and development."<sup>25</sup> This in effect gave Anglo-American blessing to proposals for a top-level parley reportedly relayed to the two leaders when NATO Secretary General Spaak sat in at one of their meetings. The heads of government of all

<sup>24</sup> See "American-British Relations," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. I, pp. 185-202.

<sup>25</sup> See "Scientific Cooperation and Atlantic Security," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. II, pp. 893-896.

### *Conference Diplomacy*

NATO countries except Portugal met in Paris from Dec. 16 to 19. Agreement was recorded on pooling of scientific facilities and information, but collaboration in that respect is still limited in practice largely to the United States and Great Britain.

On the eve of the NATO meeting Soviet Premier Bulganin dispatched a note to all members of the United Nations, and individual letters to President Eisenhower and the heads of most other NATO countries, appealing for support of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and calling for a new East-West summit meeting to seek a general European political settlement and a disarmament agreement.<sup>26</sup> A general reply to Bulganin was given by the North Atlantic Council. In the communique issued at the end of its Paris meeting on Dec. 19, the NATO government heads voiced regret at Soviet plans to boycott the recently reorganized U.N. Disarmament Commission but stated a willingness "to promote . . . any negotiations with the Soviet Union likely to lead to adequately controlled disarmament." Should Moscow persist in refusing to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission, however, "we would welcome a meeting at the foreign ministers' level to resolve the deadlock."

President Eisenhower, answering Bulganin's letter of Dec. 10 on Jan. 12, 1958, rejected various specific Soviet proposals and made counter-proposals on disarmament and on control of outer space. The President said he was ready to meet Soviet leaders to discuss East-West problems, but only if the meeting was "prepared in advance through diplomatic channels and by our foreign ministers." A second Bulganin letter, received a few days before the reply to the first one had been dispatched, was answered Jan. 20 by reference to what the President already had said. When Bulganin sent a third letter, Eisenhower suggested to him, Feb. 17, that they stop writing "speeches to each other" and start "less formal and less publicized" preparations for a summit meeting through ambassadorial or foreign ministers' conversations.

However, by that time the United States had dropped its earlier insistence on a foreign ministers' meeting in advance of a heads of government meeting. Secretary Dulles

<sup>26</sup> Bulganin renewed proposals for a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, for a ban on nuclear tests, and for creation of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe. See "Military Disengagement," *ERR*, 1958 Vol. I, pp. 143-160.

### *Editorial Research Reports*

told newsmen, Feb. 11, that the United States no longer considered such a meeting essential, though it still wanted adequate preparation to insure that a top-level meeting would "hold out good prospects of a positive result." The British government, which had been carrying on its own correspondence with Bulganin, was agreeable to preparation through either a foreign ministers' meeting or ordinary diplomatic channels.

After at first refusing to discuss in preparatory talks anything except the time and place of a summit conference, the Soviet Union on April 11 proposed that conversations on the ambassadorial level be opened in Moscow on April 17 to arrange for a foreign ministers' meeting to begin by the middle of May. The foreign ministers, in addition to settling on the time, place, and composition of a summit conference, might "exchange opinions on some . . . questions" to "determine the expediency" of including them as agenda items at the summit. This substantial agreement to Western demands brought prompt acceptance from the United States, Britain, and France.

In Moscow, April 17, however, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko insisted on talking separately with the three ambassadors. Western protests that joint meetings had been expected were unavailing, but Moscow consented to take up in the separate ambassadorial talks, not only procedural matters, but also differences over agenda subjects. Conversations were resumed on that basis at the end of May but came to an end in mid-June, when Khrushchev, who had become Premier on March 27, publicly accused the Western envoys of sabotaging preparations for a summit conference by laying down impossible conditions. Dulles countered, June 17, with the assertion that the Soviets apparently wanted to break off the preparatory work and "move directly, without preparation, into a summit meeting."

When Khrushchev returned to advocacy of a summit conference on general East-West differences, after the scheme for a top-level meeting on the Middle East had fallen through, he had the added support of Red China. Peiping Radio declared on Aug. 6 that "The Chinese people . . . firmly demand the convening of a summit conference attended by leaders of the big countries" to eliminate the threat of war and ease international tension. The impli-

### *Conference Diplomacy*

cation that Communist China would expect to participate as one of "the big countries" introduced a complicating factor into present summit prospects.



